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2/9/2015 9:10:32 PM
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[quote]Saying "I don't believe X" is epistemically identical to saying "X is false"[/quote]It's not, but even granting that then it's still just as simple as "X, which you are proposing, is false on the basis of the failing of the proposition with your evidence," which is what atheists say when confronted with God propositions, which you acknowledge.
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[quote]It's not[/quote] Of course it is. There's no epistemic middle ground between X and !X.
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Think about it like this: Your beliefs actually have zero impact on reality, I.e. whether you believe in evolution or not, it happens. This would suggest a difference between a lack of belief and a belief of lack. Technically, a Hindu person does not believe in God, but we don't label them as atheists. They lack a belief, yet you don't ask them to prove their unspoken negative claim. Saying you don't believe in evolution is ignoring it, saying you don think evolution happens is addressing it.
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It's not. Not believing X does not necessitate the belief that X is false. [quote]There's no epistemic middle ground between X and !X.[/quote]That's right, because epistemology has to do with knowledge. The middle ground is, "I don't know."
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[quote]Not believing X does not necessitate the belief that X is false.[/quote] Yes it does, otherwise you'd believe it. Not believing the invisible unicorn is there is functionally identical to believing there is no invisible unicorn. The epistemic consequence is [i]exactly[/i] the same.
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[quote]Yes it does, otherwise you'd believe it. [/quote]No. Belief is the acceptance of a claim as true. If you don't accept a claim as true, that does not necessarily mean you are then accepting the claim as false. In between those two things is, "I don't know if the claim is true or false, and am therefor unaccepting of either the true or false claims on the subject." Atheism is between those two things in the area of "As of right now, the truth claim has not provided adequate evidence to persuade me to accept it." There are atheists who [i]have[/i] accepted the false claim, at which point they do have a burden of proof. For instance, you can claim a coffee cup on your desk is God, in which case I won't just not accept your claim, but will also offer forth that it is false, as that coffee cup holds no properties we ascribe via any useful or common definition of a God. However, anyone who simply says, "I don't believe that your coffee cup is God," has simply said, "You haven't offered me sufficient evidence to substantiate your truth claim that your coffee cup is God and therefor I do not accept that claim."
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Unfortunately, despite what our language may suggest, completely neutral positions are not actually possible. You may not accept someone's claim that a coffee cup is God, but do not for a minute pretend that you then need to actively positively agree to 'the coffee cup isn't god' in order for you to believe that; it is the default position of your brain when you don't accept it being God, whether you have reasoned through that particular proposition is not the issue. You act as if the cup wasn't God, so for all intents and purposes, your belief is that it isn't.
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[quote]You act as if the cup wasn't God, so for all intents and purposes, your belief is that it isn't.[/quote]No, you do not believe that it is.
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Editado por Cultmeister: 2/10/2015 5:24:34 PMThere is no practical difference between the two positions, other than the superficial reworking of the sentence to make them sound different. If this is not so, please demonstrate how the two positions are different in the real world (ie: not just talking about the semantics and ideas involved). If one takes a completely neutral position, how would they act towards the cup? And how would that be different to someone who believes that either the cup is or isn't God? What evidence is there that there is a 'third position', other than the fact that we can simply rearrange language to create one?
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I've already explained it.
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And I've already countered it.
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Okay I guess I can see this thread again for some reason. Anyway, no.
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That's a bit rich, coming from the guy who doesn't know the definition of the word 'explanation'. I specifically asked you to demonstrate how 'God doesn't exist' is a fundamentally different position to 'I do not believe God exists', given that such a difference is not apparent in the real world, and you point me to a post which simply states that they are.
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It's okay that you don't understand how the existing line of posts already does this, Meta couldn't grasp it either. I'm not interested in dragging anyone kicking and screaming from the metaphorical cave.
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[b] [/b]
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[quote]that does not necessarily mean you are then accepting the claim as false.[/quote] Yes. It does. The rejection of any claim entails its negation. I'm not saying atheists [i]have to[/i] believe there is no God, as in actively go around telling themselves this. I'm saying a lack of belief and disbelief (or however you want to word the two frames of mind) are operationally identical in that they both entail !X by their simply negation of X.
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[quote]Yes. It does. The rejection of any claim entails its negation. [/quote]No it doesn't, and I've just thoroughly explained to you why that is. [quote]I'm saying a lack of belief and disbelief (or however you want to word the two frames of mind) are operationally identical in that they both entail !X by their simply negation of X.[/quote]Yes, and I am saying to you that that is wrong.
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Except you haven't. Somebody claiming to not be convinced by claims of the coffee cup's divinity are in exactly that position. . . Not being convinced. Which entails an implied falsehood, [i]even if[/i] the allocated probability from that specific individual isn't as definite as the allocated probability from yourself. Saying "I don't believe X" is still an inference to the null hypothesis. . .
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[quote]Except you haven't.[/quote]I have, in the above posts. Check'em out. [quote]Which entails an implied falsehood.[/quote]No, for the reasons I've already explained.
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[quote]No, for the reasons I've already explained.[/quote] You don't [i]not[/i] believe something without implying its falsehood, at all. There are varying degrees of assigned probability or certainty, sure, but there's no such thing as simultaneously believing and not believing a proposition. . . It literally just does not make sense.
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[quote]You don't not believe something without implying its falsehood, at all.[/quote]Yes, you can. And I've explained how that works already.
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Editado por Meta Cognition : 2/9/2015 10:25:29 PMYour explanations don't make sense to me. I'm literally not comprehending them, so I'm sorry if it feels like you're talking to a wall. [i]Not[/i] straying from the null hypothesis is a negation of the positive claim in whatever form that negation takes. Maybe it's because I'm tired, but I really don't see how you can refuse belief in X without resorting necessarily to !X. Even if you assign an incredibly low probability to !X as a proposition, that's still the necessary position which comes with not accepting X.
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[quote]Your explanations don't make sense to me. I'm literally not comprehending them, so I'm sorry if it feels like you're talking to a wall. [/quote]I'm fine with that.
