We are actually one of the biggest humanitarian aid donors at around [url=http://www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria]a billion dollars worth[/url]. But I'm talking about actually doing things to influence the outcome of the war. While we are providing weapons to rebels in Syria (manly in the south as al-Qaeda groups do not have a large presence in southern Syria), we are doing it at a minimal. Only certain groups are getting our weapons and our weapons are only limited to light weapons. Of course, there is a valid concern that sending "heavier" weapons will only fall into the wrong hands. Which is why we need to encourage and build up more moderate groups. Right now, more moderate groups can't do shit as they are over-powered by the larger, often-time more radical groups. We can build these groups up by financially backing them, training them, and arming them with better weapons. We are already doing this as the CIA's mission has been expanded in light of high threats of terrorism emanating from Syria. However, there is also diplomatic work to be done. For instance, we can encourage and assist more moderate (secular and moderate Islamist groups) to actually be better organized. For the sake of time, please refer to [url=http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/ten-ways-the-syrian-opposition-can-help-fight-extremism]this[/url] article. The author outlines ten steps the groups can take (with our help) in order to do this. When they do this, we would also have a good ally in Syria to provide with heavier weapons. We can also heavily pressure Assad by challenging him on UNSC Resolution 2118. Also for the sake of time, [url=http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-key-to-pressuring-assad-is-unscr-2118] refer to this article[/url]. The author outlines various ways to do so, including diplomatic and public pressure on Assad. Utilizing a credible-threat of force is also a viable option (although, as shown last year, I'm weary of the current Administration doing anything like that). For those of us who think a limited-engagement in Syria would be beneficial, we could also go that route by targeting various regime (Hezbollah included) and jihadist assets. Or, no-fly zones and humanitarian airdrops in besieged areas. The latter would be great for getting through to those areas where humanitarian aid is sparse and/or cannot reach the people in need (which is a major reason why this is the greatest humanitarian disasters in at least a decade).

Not enough is getting through, and they do not have adequate protection.