The report was rather good and it finally closes the book on several key things in the whole situation.
1: The State. Dept, the IC, and the current administration are all to blame.
2: The edits to the "CIA talking points" seemed to have changed whenever new information came in.
3. Members of al-Qaeda did, in fact, take part in the attack.
4. A response team from a few undisclosed locations simply would not have made it in time.
5. There were no protests at Benghazi.
6. The attack fed off of animosity from Cairo demonstrations and not so much a "spontaneous" thing.
and the last is what the title of this thread says.
I'm not entirely sure what we could have done to "prevent" the Benghazi attack. If we knew ahead of time, then we could of very possibly put a Marine Expeditionary Unit on alert to evacuate personnel or deployed a FAST team to provide extra security. However, neither exactly translates to preventing an attack. That feels like an idealization of intelligence and security, the sort of which led to the belief that rapid response forces could magically appear to save the day. I believe that had we been more prepared, the embassy personnel could have been evacuated. But nothing more than that, especially when you have a fractured government and non-cooperating internal entities.
I agree that when they say "could have been prevented", they are probably talking about the results of the attack. Not preventing the attack itself, but preventing the deaths of four great people.
[quote]But nothing more than that, especially when you have a fractured government and non-cooperating internal entities.[/quote]The report (somewhere close to the end, but before the additional opinions pages) states that these are both reasons for why we still haven't brought the people involved to justice. However, it notes that with the capturing of Abu Anas al-Libi, that excuse only goes so far.